The Uganda Constitution of 1995 spelt out the principle of decentralization by devolution. Accordingly, from 1995Accordingly, from to 2005 
This qualitative paper analyses the implication of recentralization of CAO appointments on downward accountability in local governments in Uganda. Data for the paper were gathered through interviewing three purposively selected CAOs and two elected district chairpersons from predominantly rural districts of Uganda, and were analyzed using thematic and content analysis. Though the findings are not generalizable to all local governments, they nuance our understanding of perverse effects of recentralization of appointment of local government staff on accountability in local governments. The paper extends scholarship on civil service management in local governments in Uganda from examining the underlying reasons for recentralization to considering the aftermath of recentralizing the appointment of the CAO.
Background
Uganda's current decentralization policy reform was launched in 1992 and consolidated through enactment of the of the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute in 1993 (Steiner, 2006; Muhumuza, 2008; Kakumba, 2008; Makara, 2009) . The country's decentralization reform was labeled 'exceptional' among developing countries in terms of the scale and scope of the transfer of power and responsibilities to the local level (Steiner, 2006) . Mitchinson (2003: 241 ) described Uganda's decentralization reform as: 'one of the most radical devolution initiatives in the developing world'.. Under Uganda's decentralization framework, the district is the highest level of local government.
Below the district are lower local governments (municipalities, city divisions, town councils, and subcounties). The District Council is the highest political organ of local government and comprises the elected district chairperson as the political head plus a number of councilors representing electoral areas of the district and interest groups youth, people with disabilities and women) (Nabaho, 2012:79) . Three fundamental innovations are discernible from Uganda's decentralization policy: a separate personnel system, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and a new power structure (Makara, 2009:137) . Under the new personnel system, a District Service Committee was established in each district local government (under the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993 and Legal Notice Supplement 1 of 1994) and entrusted with the mandate to appoint, confirm, promote, and discipline all district and urban council employees, with exception of the district executive secretary (DES) and deputy district executive secretary (DDES). The DES was the head of the district public service as well as the accounting officer.
Following the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, DESs and their deputies, who became CAOs and deputy CAOs under the new system, were also placed under the separate personnel system. This The rationale for personnel decentralization was to make all staff executing decentralized functions accountable to local governments through the CAO or town clerk as the case may be (Nsibambi, 2000) . The mandate of district local government to hire and fire their staff, including CAOs and their deputies, was further consolidated in the Local Government Act of 1997. The transfer of appointments to district local governments through the DSCs was considered to be one of the cornerstones of Ugandan decentralization reforms (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002) .
Recentralization of appointment of Chief Administrative Officers
In 2003, the Government of Uganda started rethinking the policy and local government legislation.
One of the proposed policy shifts was recentralizing of CAO appointments, taking this responsibility away from DSCs. This statement underscores the intense political pressure that CAOs were previously exposed to under the separate personnel system. However, there are justifiable fears in some quarters that recentralization may correspondingly shift political pressure on administrators away from local politicians to the central government.
Second, the rationale hinged on ensuring financial probity in the use of central government transfers under fiscal decentralization. The Local Government Act (CAP 243; GoU 1997) provides three types of fiscal transfers (conditional, unconditional and equalization grants) to local governments to implement their decentralized responsibilities (Muhumuza, 2008; Makara, 2009; Awortwi, 2011):  Unconditional grants are given as a minimum grant to local government to run decentralized services.
 Conditional grants are given for services agreed with central government and provided by local governments, and may not be used for any other purpose apart from the one for which it is provided.
 Equalization grants are given to those local governments lagging behind the national average standards in service delivery (Makara, 2009) .
By 1999, central government transfers amounted to over 93% of the local government funding (Saito, 2003) . At the same time, cases of resource misappropriation were frequently reported in the media, and reports of the Auditor General. In view of the above, central government argued for powers to appoint accounting officers who would be centrally accountable for central government transfers and use them frugally for maximum service delivery. Central government would therefore be in position to sanction accounting officers who flout financial management laws and regulations, in contrast to a separate personnel system where it would merely recommend to DSCs to take disciplinary action against errant accounting officers.
Third, it was argued that recentralization would pave the way for recruitment of suitable CAOs.
Undoubtedly, the recruitment arrangements for local government staff, including CAO, tended and
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still tends to be inward looking and biased against candidates from other districts, favouring 'sons and daughters of the soil'− i.e. people of local origin (Francis & James, 2003; Kakumba 2003 Kakumba , 2008 Awortwi, 2011; Nabaho, 2011 Nabaho, , 2012 Nabaho & Kiiza, 2013) . Instead of appointing staff 'for the district from the national labour market', errant DSCs tend to appoint staff 'for the district from the local/district labour market' (Nabaho, 2012: 80) , limiting opportunities for recruiting people with relevant competences (IGG, 2008) . The decision by the Public Service Commission to retire some CAOs due to lack of requisite qualifications immediately after recentralization lends credence to the idea that some DSCs had breached merit principles during recruitment and selection of staff.
Fourth, under a separate personnel system CAOs and their deputies could not easily be transferred to another local government jurisdiction, but had to be re-interviewed and offered appointment on transfer of service. Critics argued that this approach to managing top local government administrators equated decentralization to localization, and that the separate personnel system confined them to a rather closed system where their career progress could easily be suffocated (Kakumba, 2008) . Thus, any personnel arrangement that would enable CAOs to be transferred around the country would help their career development.
However, using recentralization of the CAO to achieve the objectives outlined above has been local councils and local government staff, resulting in a snowball effect whereby local accountability would be undermined (Steffensen, 2006; JICA, 2008 5). It is now evident that Uganda's local government system has a dual character: an integrated personnel system for CAOs, deputy CAOs and municipal town clerks, and a separate personnel system for other local government staff (Kakumba, 2008; Nabaho, 2011 Nabaho, , 2012 Nabaho & Kiiza, 2013) . This apparent policy shift has changed the philosophical basis of decentralization by devolution and created tensions between the philosophy and practice of decentralization (KiyagaNsubuga & Olum, 2009).
Post-recentralization discourse on recentralizing CAO appointments
The critical question for scholars of local governance is why the provisions of the repealed Local 'ostensible' and 'supposed', arguing that the NRM government used corruption as a scapegoat to achieve its political objectives (Muhumuza, 2008) . Skeptics of this anti-corruption strategy argue that
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corruption cannot be tacked by centralizing the office of the CAO, and that corruption at the local government level should be tackled by strengthening the local mechanisms of accountability and improving national oversight agencies such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Inspectorate of Government (Oloka-Onyango, 2007) . Improving local accountability resonates well with the principal-agent frameworks which hold that corruption is a function of monopoly plus discretion less accountability (Klitgaard, 1988) . CLGF (2007) 
Why the CAO was recentralized was clearly also related to fears around the elections with several powerful NRM officials accusing CAOs of being 'multipartists' and therefore lacking the necessary partiality in their role as designated election returning officers.
This One major conclusion from the analysis above is that central government-driven human resource management reforms for local governments do not take place in a vacuum; they are shaped by the political environment at the national level and the desire by the central government to exercise tight control over sub-national governments.
Has recentralization of CAO appointments undermined accountability?
Accountability, as a concept, has been in the public domain for many years. The concept lends itself to many interpretations. Brinkerhoff (2001:2) opines that the essence of accountability is answerability;
being accountable means having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions and/or actions. Accountability has two important dimensions: answerability and enforcement. Answerability refers to the obligation to provide information and explanations concerning decisions and actions while enforcement is the ability to oversee actors and apply sanctions when they give unsatisfactory answers (Brinkerhoff, 2001:2-5) . Recentralization of the CAO has apparently impacted on accountability in local governments in two major ways: shift in reporting and allegiance of top administrators in districts; and weakening control over the CAO by elected councils.
Shift in reporting and allegiance

No servant can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be loyal to the one and despise the other … (Luke 16:13,NKJV).
Recentralization has created two masters for the CAO: the district council and central government.
This has shifted the pattern of reporting for the CAO from being uni-directional to being bi- There was a general consensus among the two elected district chairpersons interviewed that CAOs were mostly preoccupied with accountability to central government, which has in turn softened accountability in local governments. This finding did not come as a surprise since central government wields substantial power over the CAO by virtue of being the appointing, posting and sanctioning authority. Practically, the recruiter of the CAO (central government) and a mere recipient of the CAO (local government) cannot have the same standing.
Similarly, there was a general perception among elected district chairpersons and CAOs interviewed for this research that two-way reporting had considerably affected the loyalty of the CAOs, who now suffer from 'operational' loyalty to local councils and their 'career' loyalty to central masters. An acting CAO who had served in three local governments after recentralization spoke of how challenging it was for the CAO to please both powers. One CAO described the current dilemma of
CAOs as 'being caught between a rock and a hard place'. The hardest choice a CAO has to make is whether his/her loyalty should lean more to the 'local governments with and for which he/she works'
or to the central government that appoints and deploys him/her to districts. Another CAO likened the current predicament of CAOs to "a woman married to two husbands".
Elected district chairpersons were of the view that CAOs had strategically shifted their allegiance to central government. They revealed that some CAOs now conveniently ignore a local council directive if this is not in the interest of central government. However, CAOs cannot completely ignore loyalty to local governments, since they are assigned to help local governments fulfill their statutory powers.
This dichotomy reinforces the argument that an integrated personnel system occasions split loyalties for senior officials managing decentralized services (Nabaho, 2012) . Thus an integrated personnel system appears to be the antithesis of decentralization by devolution. One conclusion that stems from the above discussion is that in a decentralized context, civil servants tend to owe allegiance to a local government they are appointed to serve rather than one in which they are assigned to work by central government.
At a policy level, the findings of this qualitative study on unintended consequences of human resource recentralization for employee loyalty should inform the current debate in Uganda on whether to recentralize the appointments of health sector staff employed through local governments. According to elected district officers, its effects have been threefold. First, CAOs are out of their duty stations (districts) most of the time since they have to balance performing their official duties and attending to their 'non-resident' families − some CAOs were described as 'visitors to districts' and their absence as 'a norm rather than an exception'. Quite often, CAOs do not seek permission from elected district chairpersons (to whom they are responsible) to be away from work and from districts, and chairperson, a former senior civil servant, said that he recently had to issue a warning letter to a CAO over rampant absenteeism from the district without permission. The elected district chairpersons argued that perennial absence of CAOs affects district operations and partly explains why districts return billions of unspent central government transfers to the national treasury at the end of the financial year. Re-remittance of central government transfers to the national treasury is not confined to the districts in this study, and Kaberamaido district reportedly returned 400 million Uganda shillings (150,944 United States dollars) to the national treasury at the end of 2011/2012 (Onyinge, 2013) .
Second, after being transferred, most CAOs regularly delay to report to their new duty stations which has a considerable toll on local government service delivery. Thirdly, when CAOs are transferred, they take considerable time to acclimatize to districts. The 'acclimatization phase' has ramifications on the performance of sub-national governments. This is exacerbated by the short interval at which CAOs are transferred from one district to another either at the volition of the Ministry of Local Government or at the request of district local government councils.
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Limited control by elected officials over CAO Recentralization has, without doubt, substantially reduced the control of elected politicians over top administrators in local governments. CAOs thought that elected district chairpersons were concerned that recentralization deprived them of their powers, and elected leaders affirmed this. Though the CAO is responsible to the elected district chairperson and the district council, the chairperson and council cannot sanction the CAO, in contrast to the pre-recentralization era, where district councils could remove CAOs through DSCs. Under the current legal regime, councils can only recommend removal of a CAO by a resolution supported by two-thirds of the council members on four grounds:
abuse of office, incompetence, misconduct or misbehavior; or physical or mental incapacity.
Elected district chairpersons were of the view that CAOs now feel they are superior and exhibit arrogant tendencies toward councilors and elected district chairpersons, for example absence without leave was described by elected chairperson as "CAOs undermining their supervisors". Thus, centralization has also rendered councils powerless in dealing with the CAO. The behavior of some CAOs towards elected leaders in local governments is a clear manifestation of how laws and policies can influence the behavior of actors in formal organizations.
Conclusion
It is evident that since 2005, there have been calculated and steady attempts by central government to unravel components of Uganda's decentralization. This paper has demonstrated how recentralization of CAO appointments has negatively impacted on reporting and accountability in local governments at a time when there are renewed calls to strengthen accountability as a key pillar of good governance, and there are no proposals for strengthening accountability of CAOs (and the entire local government civil service). The remedy for strengthening accountability of civil servants to council is to revert the responsibility of appointing CAOs to local governments to ensure that there is no disconnect between the principle of decentralization by devolution and the practice of human resource management in sub-national governments. Nevertheless, central government should, within the confines of a separate personnel system, play a visible role in recruitment of the CAO. Within the proposed devolved arrangement, it should be made mandatory for the Public Service Commission, the Ministry of Public Service, and Ministry of Local Government to be involved in recruiting the CAO. The same central government institutions should be given powers to veto any major disciplinary action administered against the CAO by local governments to avoid victimization and unfair disciplinary action. Similarly, accountability institutions at national and local level should be strengthened to deal with cases of financial mismanagement in local governments. These proposed measures will ensure recruitment of suitable CAOs (since recruitment is likely to transcend ethnic and boundary considerations), guard against unfair disciplinary action(s) against CAOs, and lessen the motivation of CAOs to breach financial laws and policies.
